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The paper contains an sxaminatioti of the Naval Data
Automation Command (NAVD\3) and the ramifications cf the
lack of long range planning upon NAVDAC. Four perspectives
are taken, examining the effect upon NAVDAC's creation,
mission, structure and control systems. The position hell
by the author is that because no long range plan existed the
Navy:
• Created an ADP ccmmani designed to correct the problems
of the past rather than implement future requirements.
• A discrepancy arose between NkVDAC's doaain and its
mission resulting in the pursuance of a modified
mission.
• The centralized functional Drganization of NAVDAC
reflects this mission.
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The Navy in 1976 faced a myriad of problems related to
its management of non-tactical Automated Data Processing
(ADP) . The ADP Reorganization Implementation Study, tasked
with developing a new ADP command, compiled a list of 93
problems confronting the Navy. With reference to this list,
the House Appropriations Committee Survey and Investigations
Staff (HAC SSI) in 1981 noted that,
The perception of the Navy's ADP problems is laraely
conditioned by the oraanization and its position rela-
tive to the Navy (internal or external) . The 93 items
can be categorized into several maior areas: organiza-
tional; lack of strong, central AD? authority: user/ADP
community understanding and relationships; duplication
of requirements and resources; and lack of cohesiveness
in any ascect of Navy's ADP programs. [ Ref . 1: p. 7]
Ths Naval Data Automation Command (MAVDAC) was established
in January 1977 as part of the Navy's attempt to rectify ADP
management.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Ths contents of this paper examine ths ramifications of ths
lack of long range planning upon NA7DAC. Four different
perspectives are taken, sxamining the effect upon NAVDAC's
creation, mission, structure and control systems. Ths posi-
tion taken is that because no plan existed:
1. The Navy created a centralized organization, without
first identifying its long terra goals and objectives
and without evaluating non-csi trali zed alternatives.

2. NAVDAC took as its orimary mission the management and
control of the Naval Regional Data Automation Centers
(NARDAC 1 s) in orier to achieve domain consensus.
3. The present NAVDA3 organization reflects -his short
range optimization and
U. Criticism of NAVDAC while potentially valid, is
sporatic at best and generally unconstrurtive because
there are not any defined goals.
The author does not hold with the opinion that NAVDAC
should not have been established, but rather that it is
impossible to measure progress towards goals and to evaluate
the method of reaching objectives when no defined goals and
objectives exist.
The major obstruction in the attempt to produce a
Navy-wide long range plan for AD? management is an attitu-
dinai difference between the individual user activities and
ADP management. The user is concerned primarily with the
effectiveness of ADP in supporting his individual mission.
The manager is concerned with achiaving a given level of
overall efficiency at a miiimal price. Neither position is
completely right of wrong. The problem exists because a
compromise position has not been reached.
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II. THE NAVAL DATA AOIDMATION COMMAND: IJJJ3 CREATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 the Navy found itsslf in a position where
spiraling ADP costs and perceived Congressional pressure
dictated a change in the management of non-tactical ADP.
The perceived solution was the creation of an ADP command
centralizing both policy and resource control. Hence the
Naval Data Automation Command (NAVDAC) was formed on 1
January 1977.
The chapter contains first an examination of the
concepts of centralization, decentralization and
regionalization . Include! is a model presented by Nolan
describing The six stages of data processing growth within
an organization.
The examination presented in the second section
describes Congressional criticism of the Air Force data
processing command and how the Navy interpreted -his criti-
cism tc apply to the Navy \ DP situation.
Thirdly an examination of Navy action leading up to the
formation of NAVDAC is presented, including the status of
ADP prior to NAVDAC.
The position held by the authsr is that NAVDAC was
created in response to perceived, and possibly real, organi-
zational pressures at the time. "More often, a
corporation's existing 5DP organization is the result of
historic happenstance, the beliefs of influential managers,
or an apparent fit with the overall organization structure"
[Ref. 2: p. 733- Ir i- s proposed that a more correct
approach would have been the creation of a Navy-wide plan
for non-tactical ADP, and then if warranted by the plan, the
creation of an organization to implement the plan.
11

1 • Central ization and Decentralization
Centralization and decentralization as used within
the context of this paper refer to the level of the organi-
zation in which decision making occurs. In a centralized
organization, decisions are made by individuals highly
placed in the organizational hierarchy, whereas in a decen-
tralized organization, the decision making responsibility is
delegated lower in the organization. Benefits normally
associated with centralization include elimination of redun-
dant functions therefore lower overall cost. Dften, because
the decision maker is removed from the actual site, the
guaiity cf the decision da teriorates . Decentralization is
assumed to produce a better decision, because the decision
maker is closer to the scene. [Ref. 3: p. 111] Negatively,
decentralization requires some degree of functional redun-
dancy in that similar jobs are replicated in each division.
Also decentralization can result in short term gains beina
pursued to the detriment of the whole.
In a purely theoretical context, centralization and
decentralization relate nereiy to fc he level of decision
making. It is assumed that in both instances the proper
level of control is maintained. When long range planning is
not carried out by an organization, control deteriorates
because there is no yardstick against which a decision maker
can measure his decisions. Each decision maker assumes that
the choice made, while best within his particular context,
will also be best for the organization as a whole. Since no
plan exists it is difficult to assert otherwise. The prob-
lems caused by the lack of a long range plan do not become
particularly evident in \ centralized organization because
decisions are made higher in the organization structure.
The number of decision makers is reduced and the decision
makers span of control is larger. Therefore the decision
12

maker has a broader picture and better concept of the needs
of the entire organization. It is in a decentralized organ-
ization where the number Df decision makers is increased and
the span of control for the individual decision maker is
reduced, that the lack of a long range plan becomes particu-
larly evident. Therefore, centralization is often perceived
as a method of increasing control, because the number of
individuals holding decision making authority is reduced.
In reality control is not necessarily increased, the coordi-
nation problem is merely lessened. As will be seen later,
the relevance of this concept was that the Navy perceived
centralization as a method of increasing control.
2 • Regional iza tion
During the period of time surrounding NAVDAC's crea-
tion, it was assumed that economies of scale would be
realized in the large computer center. In economic theory
economies of scale mean that an increase in size of 100
percent will yield a greater than 103 percent output. "The
concept of "economies of scale" in economics of production
implies that a large system can produce output at a faster
rate and at a lower cost that a smaller system" [Ref. 4: p.
83].
Regional izat ion refers to the actual physical loca-
tion of a computer system, with the region being formed
based on either functional or geographic lines. The assumed
benefits to be gained through regionalization included:
• Users which individually could not afford computing
capability could receive time on a regionalized
computer.
• Better use could be made of programmers/ analysts by
pooling them in a geographic area. Talent could be
selectively drawn for specific projects and individual
13

growth through training achieve! because of the large-
number of applications being developed.
• Per unit cost of competing coull be reduced because of
the larger number of applications run. Additionally the
greater workload of a large ronputer center justified
more equipment, therefore more capabilities could be
offered. [ lef- 2: p. 74 ]
Regionalizatior. does not necessarily imply centralized
decison making and resource control. A decentralized
activity with regionalized computing centers would exhibit a
si-uaticn where individual centers would have more control
over their respective activities. The economies of scale
assumed to be realized through the monolithic computer
center are not influenced by the level of decision making.
3- rata Processing Growth
Bichard Nolan identifies six stages of data
processing growth within an organization. Briefly these
stages and their relevant characteristics are:
• Stage 1 - Initiation. Several low level operational
systems in a functional area.
• Stage 2 - Contagion. A low control, high slack period
that results in innovation and extensive application of
data processing technology and concurrent increasing ADP
costs.
• Stage 3 - Ccntrol. Characterized by a transition from
computer (hardware) management to data resource manage-
in en t
.
• Stage 4 - Integration. Data bass and data communication
technologies are moved into key application areas, with
increased DP expenditures similar to stage 2.
14

• Stage 5 - Data Administration. Characterized by shared
data and and common systems.
• Stage 6 - Maturity. Characterized by data resource and
strategic planning.
Each stage is characterized by some measure of
management control, with stages of lew relative cost and low
innovation eguated to high control and stages of high rela-
tive cost, high innovation equated to low control.
Therefore the level of control maintained influences both
the utilization of resources and technological gains made by
the organization. "When management permits organizational
slack in the DP activities, it coamits more resources to
data processing than ace strictly necessary to get the job
done. The extra payment achieves another objective
nurturing of innovation" [Ref. 5: p. 117].
Stages 2 and 4 exhibit explosive growth rates and
corresponding data processing budget increases.
Organizations finding theaselves in these stages reach a
point where the data processing budget increases become
unacceptable and hence will seek sobs method of increasing
control. Nolan suggests some methods of increasing control
which include the development of standardized systems, thus
decreasing costs by eliminating the need for locally unique
systems, and chargeback nethods, which place the financial
responsibility upon the user, eiininating ADP as a free
good.
B. GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCES
Motivated by the Brooks Act of 1965, governmental atti-
tudes favored centralization of resource control and




In 1975 Congress directed that "all automated system
design, development or procurement, software maintenance,
and equipment evaluation and selection required by any Air
Force element will be accomplished by the Air Force Data
Automation Agency" [ Ref . 6]. Admittedly it was up to the
Navy to place their interpretation upon this direction.
Some officials felt that no Navy specific guidance should be
read into the statement. The majority though felt that the
fact that the Congress rf as now directing organizational
change portended potential upheaval, particularly for the
Navy, which lacked a strong centralized data automation
command. "Generally, it is felt that. .. Congress expects
(and in the case of the Air Force, directs) the Services to
commence a centralization of automated system life-cycle
support" [Ref. 7: pp. 12-13].
The apparent solution to the Navy had three characteris-
tics; centralization of resource control, regionalized data
processing centers, and chargeback systems. The latter
characteristic will be discussed in greater depth in chapter
4. As stated by one Navy official:
We seem to be at the point in time in the development of
A DP technology when we should place more emphasis on
management or ADP as a "common service" or as a
"resource" to be made available to users on a reimbur-
sable basis and not necessarily owned and controlled by
them. This was recommended m the 31ue Ribbon Panel
Report. Second, it appears that there is now a great
potential for savings to be made in equipment costs and
personnel requirements through consolidation of Dresent
ADP activities either functionally or aeograDhically.
Ihirdj, mors centralized overall coordination' and control
of ADf resources appear to be indicated because cf the
riaid data discipline requirements. the larae personnel
and equipment costs, and the multi-functional, multi-





1. NAVDACls Predecessor : OP;91
At the time of the ADP reorganization in 1976 r
management control was resident in OP-91 (Director
Information Systems Division). Created in 1963, DP-91 was
the result of a 1966 study which recommended "the establish-
ment of a strong, centralized organization in OPNAV to
coordinate and control information and data systems"
[Ref. 7: p. 7].
While policy control was centralized in OP-91,
budgetary control, program design and data processing
installation (DPI) operation was left to individual activi-
ties. "The fundamental management strategy in the Navy is
centralized policy direction, decentralized program execu-
tion and decentralized control of resources" [Ref. 9: p.
43]. This conflicted with the governmental attitude previ-
ously expressed which emphasized centralization of resource
control. 3y 1976 the Navy had 450 data processing installa-
tions (DPIs) supported by 12,500 people, of which only 636
were afloat. Most of tiese DPI' = were single activity
dedicated [Ref. 7: p. 10].
The situation of decentralized resource control
resulted in duplication of functions, an inability to coor-
dinate multi-command or common site applications across a
disparate variety of users, and an inability to monitor AD?
related costs with any degree of accuracy.
The unfavorable image presented by the Navy AD?
management program was further aggrevated by comparison with
the Air Force and Army. Both services had a centralized ADP
command which provided high level policy direction.
Additionally the Services maintained centralized control of
automated data systems (ADS) development which provided for
the successful standardization of systems that the Navy was
17

unable to maintain. "Both the Army and Air Force have
established a central ADS development activity. .. for multi-
command and common base operations ADS" [Ref. 7: p. 33].
Through various Navy management consolidations OP-91
wore four "hats". It reported not only to DP-090 in its
OP-91 position, but to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for financial management (ASN(FM)) as Director, Department
of the Navy ADP, to OP-39U as OP-09UE (Information Systems
Coordinator, WwMCCS) and MAT-39 as MAT-09L for Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) data processing functions.
[Ref. 7: p. 8]
Between fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 1976 the
Department cf the Navy's ADP budget increased by $98 million
from £278 million to $375 million. Hardware expenditures
alone increased by almost HQ% between fiscal year 1975 and
1976. Due to upward spiraling ADP expenditures the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) implementel an obliga-
tional ceiling for ADP spending in Harch of 1973. Direct
control was lacking though in that no prior approval was
required to exceed the limitation. "Ref. 7: pp 77-78]
Despite the increase in the Navy's ADP budget,
personnel staffing in OP-91 had decreased from 158 in fiscal
year 1971 to 51 in fiscal year 1976. Consequently mission
areas suffered or were ignored because of personnel const-
raints. These areas included:
• Long range planning.
• Monitoring of approved information systems development.
• Assessment of ADP facility and system performance.
• Research and development inputs to OP-098 for ADP
exploitation in Navy information systems.
• Advice on ADP manpower requirements of the Navy.
13

• Central coordination of business and logistic ADS
development and ADPE acquisition for operation shipboard
and aviation requirements.
The opinion expressed by one Navy official concerning the
status of Navy A DP management *as that,
Our present ADP structure appears as one which is radi-
cally fragmented and inefficient. The resultant
Drobiercs are many. The aost critical point, however, is
that the Navy is just not doing th= best it can with the
resources available because of the inadequate control
over resources. This structure protects the skills of
yesterday, prevents Navy technological advances. and
will net provide the management tools needed for tomor-
row's Navy. [ Hef . 10]
The concentration at the time was upon resource control.
Relating back to Nolan's six stages of data processing
growth, increased control signifies a move into a stage
three organization. OTn fortunately increased resource
control does not necessarily imply improved resource manage-
ment. Resource control suggests the ability to do with
resources as one wishes. Management implies the utilization
of resources to achieve the objectives of the organization
in the best possible manner.
2« ^h§_ Shear Memoranda
m
On 25 March 1976, Admiral Shear, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations (VCNO) , commissioned a study groap under the
direction of Rear Admiral James W. Nance to examine Navy ADP
management. Since 50 percent of the Navy's non-tactical
budget resided within the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT)
the group was to consider the possibility of consolidating




3ver the past several ysirs, OP-91 has been drastically
reduced in personnel numbers, yafc the function to be
cerformed have increased.,..
A large proportion of business ADP and information
systems involve various parts of ths Material Command.
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider centralizing
the execution cf these functions in NAVMAT. An organi-
zation in NAVMAT could also assume cognizance ever much
:f the ADP work currently going on in the various
Systems Commands, perhaps with economies in personnel
and hardware/software assets. [Raf. 11]
Specifically the study group was to address the feasibility
of the centralized ADP command concept, a proposed organiza-
tional placement, the functions to be performed" by the
organization, and estimated costs and benefits.
Response from the Systems Commands was almost immed-
iate and generally negative. Tha predominant opinion
expressed was that a centralized command would reduce flexi-
bility and inhibit the conmarder in the performance of his
mission. Particular concern was addressed to the area of
new systems development and responsiveness to the unique
needs, of the user. As stated by one Navy official,
The proposal would effectively striD functional comman-
ders (supply, maintenance, operators, ets.) of the
resources" required to carry out their responsibilities.
Transfer of all Navy ADP oersonnel resources from their
present functional commands to the control of a monol-
ithic Computer Systems Command is considered an
over-reaction to tne genuine problem. While it is
conceded that there are' deficiencies and duplication of
effort involved in the present Navy ADP' management
structure, it is felt that the proposed solution may
lead to the opposite extreme; I.e., o verstr essing ADP
standardization and economy to the detriment of respon-
siveness to the functional mission commander. ADP
operations are not the heart of many operating logistic
commands and without some control over their functions,
it would be impossible to hold a commanding officer
accountable for carrying out his mission. [Ref. 12]
An implicit assumption of the Systems Commands was that the
user truly had unique needs, and that responsiveness could
best be provided through decentralized resource control.
2D

The statement also points to an additional problem,
different perceptions of AD? by the user and the Navy hier-
archy. The user command perceived A DP as a tool to assist
in accomplishing the aission, whereas influenced by
Congressional pressure, the Navy viewed ADP as an end item,
to be eccnomized as much as possible. Standardization to
the user suggested unresponsiveness to his needs whereas
standardization to the ADP manager suggested efficiency of
operation.
3 . The Nance Heport
The interim report submitted by the Nance Committee
to the VCNO delineated two alternatives that were being
considered as viable solutions;
• Leave ADP directly under CNO by establishing a Computer
Systems Command as a Field Command similar to the OP-094
relationship with the r elecommunioa tions Command.
• Transfer ADP to tha Chief of Naval Material (CNM) and
establish a Deptuty Chief of Naval Material (DCNM) r
Project Management Office or a Computer Systems Command.
[Ref. 13: p. 1]
Both alternatives included the transfer of staff, systems
design and data processing operations to the new command.
While noting that the Systems Commands supported a
more "status guo" approach of retaining systems design func-
tions under control of the Systems Commands with staffing
functions transferred to CNM, the report recommended the
second alternative as the most feasible.
The final report submitted by the Nance Committee
recommended that the new I^DP command be located under CNM
with a residual staff located under 3P-094 to act as AD?
program/budget sponsor and at the kS$ (FM) level to assist in
21

reviewing automated data processing equipment (ADPE)
requests.
Also recommended was the establishment of a follow
on study group to consider in depth the logistics of
creating a new command, including such actions as drafting
a recommended charter, needed documentation and designing an
internal organizational structure.
** • The A DP Im2l§l§Hil^i£ii Study
The Navy ADP Reorganization Implementation Plan
Study Group was the foils* on group established as recom-
mended by the Nance report. The report produced by the
study group offered the first conoisa delineation of prob-
lems facing Navy ADP management. Up until this point
progress had been made on the general premise that the Navy
needed better control of its &DP resources and this control
would be realized in the creation of a centralized command.
Two major problem areas were identified in Navy ADP
management, first in Informations Systems Managment and
second in Automatic Data Processing.
Information Systems are an expression of functional
managers' requirement for information needed to manage
the zunctional area. Automatic Data Processing is one
3f many resources ussd to implement and suDport
Information S ystems. . . Be tter management or control of
ADP will aid in improving Information Svstems
Management. ( Bef . 7: p 23]
An implicit assumption in the above statement, and one that
can be traced through the Navy action leading to NAVDAC's
creation was that increased oontrol of AD? would produce
better information management. The author cannot concur
with this assumption. ADP in the strictest sense is simply
transaction processing. Improving ADP allows us to process
information faster and at lower cost. In no instance does
improving our processing ability guarantee that the
22

information we are collecting and processing is the correct
informa tion.
The Implementation Study concluded that "the Navy
should place the management of its ADP resources in an ADP
Command" [Ref. 7: p. 9«* ]. Additionally it was recommended
that the AD? Comirand assume responsibility for four regional
data system support centers (SSC) . It was hoped that this
new organization would provide centralized control and
centralized execution, similar to the Air Force and Army.
5 . Summary
That changes were needed in the methods in which the
Navy managed its non-tactical ADP resources was not ques-
tioned. Spiraling ADP budgets, redundant systems and billet
cuts, combined with perceived Congressional pressure made
this evident to the Navy. What wis questioned was what
constituted the proper changes. Ih? majority favored a
centralized command of some sort although the degree of
centralization was greatly debated. Those who favored a
more decentralized approach were largely ignored. One
discenting individual stated that,
The modern trend in the computing world is toward decen-
tralization and away from the larg = computing centers we
have known for years... in dissecting OP-91, we ought
not to be talking about re-assembling it in some
central-complex; we ought to be talking aoout dispersing
its functions to take advantage Df the caDability of
modern computers, not those of ten years ago. A. the
same time," we ouaht to be talking about iron-fisted
control of those dispersed functions... [Ref. 14]
It is suspected that a decentralized philosophy
towards ADP management was not viewed as feasible because it
represented to many the embodiment of the exact problems
that were being attempted to be corrected, redundant hard-
ware, personnel and systems, and most importantly the lack
of resource control. The opinion towards decentralized
management as expressed by the Nance report was that,
23






This decentralized management of the large computer
installations has made it difficult, if not impossible,
to accurately forecast overall hardware requirements ana
develop and implement a consolidated long-range ADP
plan. [Ref. 15: p. 2]
The discussion appears to hinge on the question of
how unique the systems operated by local commands were, and
how responsive to the users a centralized command might be.
The assumption of those favoring centralization was that
responsiveness could be maintained.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The creation of NAVDAZ was predicated upon solving the
problems of the past with little or no consideration of the
future of non-tactical ADP. The problems consisted of
increasing ADP costs, redundant systems and untrained
personnel. Perceived Congressional pressure favored
centralization of policy and resource control. The Nance
study group fulfilled its charter and examined the feasi-
bility of a centralized command. Likewise the
Implementation study produced the documentation necessary to
implement the new command.
The lack of a long range plan is viewed by the author as
the primary obstruction in the successful management of Navy
ADP. The strategic planning process is that future oriented
process resulting in the formulation of "a mission, goals,
strategies, programs, and allocation of resources that will
enable an organization to best cope with and influence an
uncertain future" [Ref, 15: p. 45]. The important concepts
are those of mission, goals and resources. A mission gives
direction to an organization and makes it unique. Goals are
quantifiable objectives against which an organization can be
24

measured and its performance evaluated. Resources ar a
utilized to achieve the goals sought. The degree to which
an organization complies with its strategic objectives
determines its effectiveness.
The accomplishment of strategic planning in itself
requires a ccmmitment of organizational resources.
Organizations unwilling to make this resource commitment
lack a plan and consequently find themselves reacting to
their environment rather than influencing it. The Navy
found itself in this position with regard to ADP. NAVDAC
was created in reaction to the environment rather than as a
method of implementing the future. As stated by one
individual,
The usual method of approaching a task of the magnitude
envisioned by the ADP" staff study is to define tne full
objective sought, plan for its achievement, and organize
to execute the pian. It appears that the ADP Study is
beginning at the third step. It is considered -that
until the notional plans, including forecasts,, objec-
tives, strategies, programs, budgets, procedures and
policies will have been converted into a DON System Pian
that it appears premature to attempt to validate a
concept to reorganize AD? personnel. [Ref. 17]
All action taken by the Navy concentrated on the creation of
a centralized command. Such action concentrated upon
solving the problems of the past, rather than attempting to
cope with the future. It is proposed by the author that a
more productive AD? management would have evolved had the
Navy identified where it was going with ADP in the future
and created a command to implement the future. The problems
encountered in the past are not r.ecsssarily the problems of
the present or the future.
25

III. NAVDAC: IT1S MISSION
A. INTEODOCTION
When NAVDAC was formed its stated mission was to control
those resources assigns! to it (the Data Processing
Installations (DPIs)) acid tc manage the Navy non-tactical
ADP program, including budget coordination.
Interviews conducted in conjuction with this paper have
suggested that there is currently confusion over what
NAVDAC s mission is and should be. Two parties of thought
appear to exist. One views NAVDAC's mission as being solely
to manage the operation of the Navy Regional Data Automation
Commands (NARDAC *s) . A second view held is that NAVDAC
exists primarily to manage the Navy-wide ADP program. The
examination contained in this chapter seeks to document the
historical roots of this confusion and suggest that such
confusion might have been circumvented had a Navy-wide ADP
plan been in existence.
First examined in this chapter will be the concept of
mission and domain, and the ramifications when consensus is
not achieved. Mission consensus will be discussed from the
intra -organizational aspect and domain consensus from the
aspect of the organization and its relevant environment.
Secondly the discussion will focus upon NAVDAC's
specific domain and missiDn , suggesting that NaVDAC limited
its domain and concentrated en achieving only a portion o
its mission in order to ensure organizational survival.
It is felt by the author that the confusion over
NAVDAC's mission stems from a discrepancy between NAVDAC"
mission and NAVDAC's domain. Specifically, that the domain
is too limited for NAVDA3 to achieve its original mission,





The mission of an organization is "the broadest
strategic planning choice" [Ref. 16: p. 47]. It is the
organization's specific mission that makes it unique from
others. Too narrow and restrictive a mission choice
detracts from an organization's ability to cope with a
changing environment. Too broad a mission encourages an
organization to pursue sometimes unrelated markets based
solely on potential for profit, whan no management expertise
exists internal to the organization. Missions are not
static but can evolve, generally doing so slowly.
A primary characteristic of the mission is that it needs
to be explicitly stated. By doing so a comparison can be
made between individual and organizational goals.
One of the primary values of explicit statements of
mission and objectives is that thsy provide a railyina
point for those who can ally themselves with them and a
clear indication to those who cannot that they miaht
wish tc consider alternative organizations as the source
of their economic and psychic satisfaction. [Ref. 16:
p. 143]
When an organization fails to explicitly
mission its rallying point is lost. "Organizations that do
not discuss their basic mission and purpose will inevitably
lose whatever consensus may have once existed aitcng its
members as to their common purpose" "Ref. 16: p. 143]. This
loss of mission consensus can be due to environmental and
personnel changes, that alter the complexion of the organi-
zation. As will be demonstrated, within NAVDAC this loss of
mission consensus has been exemplified by an overemphasis
upon the service orients! portion of its mission to the
detriment of its policy oriented mission.
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Long range plans assist an organization in the implemen-
tation of its mission, delineating objectives and milestones
to be met. When a formal plan is noa-existent, an organiza-
tion lacks definitive guidance on the action to be taken in
order to accomplish its mission.
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT OF DOMAIN
Mission consensus refers to internal agreement among
organizational members. Domain consensus refers to an
agreement between an organization and its relevant environ-
ment. The domain of an organization defines the;
• technologies (hardware, software, personnel) used by the
crgainzation
,
• the population served, and
• goods or services supplied to the clients [ Ref . 18: p.
229].
The relevant domain of an organization influences the
chances of an organization achieving its mission. Tec small
a domain suggests that the entire mission will not be
achieved because the environment will not recognize the
organization's right to provide that service.
The particular importance in the concept lies in the
fa.cz that the domain "determines the points at which the
organization is dependent upon others for the resources,
referrals, and other -'/pes of support required for its
survival" [Ref. 19: p. 20].
Because resources (clients, msney, technology) are
limited the potential for oonflict exists between an organi-
zation and its relevant environment. Domain consensus
defines a set of expectations, both for members of an
organization and for others with whom they interact.
about what the organization will and will not do. It
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Drovides. although imp erfectly, an image of the
organization's role in a larger system, which in turn
serves as a guide for the ordering of action in certain
directions and not in others. [Ref. 20: pp. 28-29]
The implication is that when domain consensus is not
achieved, resource contention will exist between the organi-
zation and its task environment. Sines resources are needed
for the organization to achieve its mission, failure to
achieve domain consensus can effect the future survival of
the organization. "A domain becomss operational only when
the organizations* rights to domain are recognized by those
whose support is needed" * Ref. 19: p. 20]. Because the
defense of one's domain is resource costly, it is the
author's presumption that NAVDAC reduced its cost and
ensured its survival by reducing the size of its domain.
Two major points are svident. The first that domain
consensus must be achieved for organizational survival. The
second that too small a domain may inhibit the accomplish-
ment of the entire mission. When th= environment does not
recognize the organization's right to perform a certain
service, contention arises. With the Navy this unrecognized
domain element was policy f ormularion
.
D. NAVDAC'S DOMAIN
The ADP Implementation Study recommended that the
following data processing resources be transferred to the
new ADP command:
• OP-91 Staff, less those personnel transferred tc OP-942
• ADP Eguipment Selection Office (ADPESO)
• Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT)
• Naval Material Command Support Activity (NMCSA)
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• Naval Accounting and Finance Center/ Comptroller of the
Navy's ADP resources
• Naval District, Washington's ADP resources.
The losing parent organization of the above activ-
ities was to transfer along with the activity, a
pro rata share of its supporting resources.






• Manpower Analysis Centers - LANT/PAC ADP resources
• Fleet Assistance Groups - LANT/PAC ADP resources




San Francisco [Ref. 7: p. 96].
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The Nance Report, discussed in the previous chapter,
examined the feasibility of establishing an ADP command
under the auspices of NAVMAT. Recommended for consolidation
in the Nance Report, but not included by the follow or.
Implementation Study wees the Central Design Activities
(CDA's) belonging to the various Systems Commands. A CDA
provides, for its respective functional command, systems and
programming support. Multi -command applications confined to
one functional area would not fall under the cognizance of
NA7DAC but under the functional sponser. Specifically the
CDA ' s and their functional sponsors were:
CENO - Naval Sea Systems Command
CASDO - Naval Sea Systems Command
MSDO - Naval Air Systems Command
FACSO - Naval Facilities Engineering Command
FMSO - Naval Supply Systems Command
Justification for the exlusion of the CDA's was based
upon the fact that "NAVDAC and its subordinate AD? Support
Centers have been established principally on the basis that
the Command is responsible for pure data processing func-
tions" [ Ref . 7: p. 47]. It was felt that the cost (stated
in terms of performance) of separating the data processing
functions from the CDA's would far outweigh the benefits to
be gained. Additionally it was stated that if in the future
NAVDAC demonstrated the capabilities to handle these addi-
tional responsibilities, then consideration could be made as
to their transfer. [Ref. 7: p. 47]
In terms of cur definition of domain , the technologies
used were those activities transferred to NAVDAC. The popu-
lation served were those Navy activities needing general ADP
support. The service provided was pure data processing.
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Excluded from the domain ware the Systems Commands and their
respective CDA's.
This activity division, whils pacifying the Systems
Commands brought about the first problem with NAVDAC's
conception of it's mission, a concentration on the general
data processing installation. This was despite the fact
that NAVDAC was still to retain CDA responsibility for
multi-function applications.
Interviews with Navy officials revealed that NAVDAC felt
that to assume control of the CDA's would be too large a job
initially. The approach was to get ^ne's own house in order
before expanding. Provision was maia for NAVDAC to evaluate
in the future the concept of centralized control of the
CDA's.
A point should be made at -his time concerning the lack.
of a long range plan. Without suoh a plan no evaluation
criteria exist. Without these criteria it becomes impos-
sible to prove objectively that NAVDAC, at any time, was
ready to assume responsibility for CDA control. Those indi-
viduals disputing NAVDAC 's right to manage the CDA's could
offer a counter arguement at any time. Additionally no time
frame was ever established for the projected expansion.
The thesis is not making an atteapt no support the posi-
tion that control of the CDA's should reside with NAVDAC.
Instead it is trying to point out that proponants of the
idea would have had better justification had some measurable
milestones been established when NAVDAC was formed.
E. NAVDAC S MISSION
The centralization of polio y in an ADP command was not a
new move. Up until the oreation of NAVDAC, Navy policy in
the area of non-tactical ADP had been centralized control
with decentralized program execution. OP-9 1 had been
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created to effect this centralized control, but successive
billet cuts had reduced OP-91's mission effectiveness.
OPNAVINST 5U50.200 was released in December, 1978 r
almost two years after the formation of NAVDAC was
announced. It stated the mission of NAVDAC as being to:
Administer and coordinate the Navy non-tactical ADP
program. This responsibility includes collaboration of
ADP matters with all Navy ADP claiaants: development of
policy and procedures; approval of systems development,
acquisition/utilization of ADP equipment and service
contracts; sponsoring of AD? technology, and career




The functions delineated as to be performed by NAVDAC,
almost exclusively concern coordination of Navy-wide ADP.
Yet the House Appropriations Committee, Survey and
Investigations Staff (HAC 5 51) described NAVDAC in 1981 as
being "relatively ineffectual in carrying out its mission
responsibilities from a Navy-wide standpoint" "Ref. 22: p.
141 ]. The position held by the author is -hat the OPNAVINST
was promulgated two years too late. By the rime it was
published, NAVDAC had concentrated its economic resources on
NARDAC management and esxao lished its domain as general data
processing support to user commands.
The original intent of NAVDAC in the policy arena was
described in the ADP Implementation Study, discussed in
chapter 2. In the Implementation Plan it was stated that
"NAVDAC will develop, in consonance with policy guidance
from the ASN(FM), the 3NO, and other higher authority,
concepts, objectives, plans, and procedures relating to AD?
and information systems management in the Navy" [Ref. 7:
v.2, p r D-33]. Additionally, "NAVDAC will develop revised
ADP rules/directives/regulations and monitor compliance"
[Ref. 7: v.2, p. D-33].
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Two assumptions appear to have been made by the
Implementation Study, which have not proved to be valid over
time. The first assumption is that NAVDAC would receive
adequate policy guidance. When adejuate policy guidance is
not forthcoming an organization can take one of two diffe-
rent, directions; 1) either develop policy internally and
submit for approval, or 2> concentrate resource utilization
on that portion of the organizational mission where
successful results might be realized. The HAC SSI attri-
buted the failure of internal policy development to the fact
that NAVDAC was buried too lew in the organizational hier-
archy to be effective. "As a result, commands with more
senior level support (three- and fojr-star flag rank) are
able to influence the actions of NAVDAC irrespective of th a
merits cf the issue" [Sef. 22: p. 144]. The Navy officially
disagreed with the Committee's comments concerning the
organizational placement of NAVDAC.
The author's assessment is that NAVDAC never had a
chance to effect real chaige in the area of Navy-wide AD?
management. Not necessarily due to its organizational
placement but because of domain consensus. The domain
allotted to NAVDAC consisted of control cf general purpose
regionalized centers. Success in the area of Navy wide
policy would have resulted in trespassing into domains
belonging to other organizations ii the relevant environ-
ment, and ultimately resulted in resource conflict. It is
felt by the author that this situation would have transpired
regardless of NAVDAC's organizational placement.
The second assumption is that NAVDAC, along with moni-
toring compliance with A DP policy, might effect some
remedial action. Location of NAVDAC under the CNO was
advised because cf the necessary clout that would be needed
"in a down chain direction in order to direct performance of
all Navy activities" [Ref. 7: p. 69]. Whether this clout
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has been underutilized, or the remedial action was ignored,
the HAC SSI stated in 1981 that, "th = major claimants. . . were
each observed to be abiding by their own policies and proce-
dures which had been established long before the advent of
NAVDAC" [Ref. 22: p. 142]. Again this failure to demons-
trate the clout desired stems from a reluctance to interfere
in what is not considered NAVDAC's domain.
Realizing that policy is an area in which only limited
progress has been made NA7DAC has taken to issuing adviso-
ries. Carrying no ramifications if not followed, the
advisories offer advice to commands based upon lessons
learned.
In view of the circumstances surrounding NAVDAC's estab-
lishment, one must question whether the Navy actually needed
a new centralized organization. 3P-91, although admittedly
understaffed, already existed to effect centralized policy.
The major addition to NAVDAC was the incorporation of the
DPI ' s . This move was in keeping with the emphasis upon
reducing costs and increasing efficiency through economies
of scale.
F. LONG RANGE PLANNING
Interviews with Navy officials have suggested that there
is a lack of consensus at all levels of the Navy concerning
the mission of NAVDAC. The origins of the loss of mission
consensus stems from NAVDAC's selection of a limited domain.
This limitation achieved domain consensus and reduced
NAVDAC's dependency upon the environment, probably ensuring
NAVDAC's survival, but at an organizational cost. It is
felt that those who propose NAVDAC's mission as being that
of managing the NAVDAC's, are viewing primarily the domain
NAVDAC has to work with. Conversely, those who view NAVDAC
as existing tc manage Navy -wide ADP are considering
primarily NAVDAC's mission statement.
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The limited domain rspresents a loss of direct control
by NAVDAC over a large portion of Navy non-tactical ADP.
Implementing policy without direct control over the relevant
activities has proved to be non-product ive, therefore rein-
forcing NAVDAC* s concentration upon the DPI's, where
progress can be realized. By allowing the System Commands
to retain control of the CDA's, NA7DAC*s chances of devel-
oping successful standardized systems across function lines
have been decreased.
Two thoughts are offered for 002 sideratior. . The first
is that had a long range plan been ii existence prior to the
formation of NAVDAC, the inconsistency between NAVDAC*s
mission and domain might have been resolved. Either by
decreasing NAVDAC*s mission or increasing NAVDAC* s domain.
Because no defined goals and objectives existed it became
difficult to recognize that action taken by NAVDAC did not
support the entire mission.
The second thought is that it has proved impossible
since NAVDAC* s creation to publish an effective long range
plan and probably will continue to rsmain so, because of the
domain consensus problem. Long range planning en a
Navy-wide basis would dictate involvement in other's
domains, which it is suspected would prove to be
unacceptable.
Because a long range plan was non-existent, the concen-
tration upon the NARDAC*s was allowed to continue. Progress
was being demonstrated, although its contribution to overall
areas could not be measured. Chapter 4 will attempt to
demonstrate how the concentration upon the DPI's, and short





The major point addressed in ths first two chapters of
this paper has concerned the problems that have arisen due
to the lack of a non-tactical ADP strategic management plan.
That, such an item is difficult to produce is admitted. ADP
involves all functional areas and while Congress and the
Navy may feel the need to more tightly control ADP expendi-
tures, individual commands may see ADP as simply a tool to
be used in the performance of a mission.
What is the status of the strategic management plan?
"In December 1978, GAD reminded ths Navy that it had not
developed an integrated long range plan for its ADP program.
A firm commitment was male by ths Navy at this time to
develop such a plan in 1979" [Ref. 23: p. 21].
A draft Department of the Navy Strategic Management plan
fcr ADP has been developed but holds little promise for
helping tc remedy the situation. In it's introduction, the
Plan states that "the Plan does not address a specific time
frame. The goals are not intends! to represent desired
specific, achievable results, and in fact may never be fully
attained. Rather, they represent broad areas that future
ADP-related efforts are expected to focus on" [Ref. 24].
The plan is divided into two general sections, strategic
ADP goals and functional automation goals. The strategic
ADP section is representative of the direction the Navy
would like to move with regard to ADP in general, standardi-
zation, training, etc. The functional area refers
specifically to areas for development and demonstrates no
direct relationship to the general goals laid out in the
strategic section. Functional sponsors are encouraged to
adopt Navy goals in the specification of new systems, but




IV. NAVDAC: ITS ORGANIZATION
A- INTRODUCTION
The following chaptar contains an examination of
NAVDAC's internal organization. The position held by the
author is that NAVDAC's functional organization is a reflec-
tion of their mission choice to concentrate en the DPI's.
Based upen work by Chandlar, the discussion will focus on
the strategy adopted by NAVDAC, and how -his is exemplified
by the functional organization.
The NARDAC's will be discussed as boundary spanning
units. Based upon a modal developed by Ouchi and Barney,
the change in data processing services from mission funding
to Naval Industrial Funding (NIF) will be discussed. This
section provides an example of a transaction (the "sale" of
data processing services) a s it occurs internal and external
to the organizational boundaries.
Both structure as a result of strategy, and transaction
governance will be examined as attempts to ensure the future
survival of the organization.
Finally, the subject of reorganization will be
discussed, with an alternative functional organization
proposed.




Strategy has been defined earlier as "broad programs
for achieving the organization's objectives and thus imple-
menting its mission" [Ref. 25: p. 100]. Nathanson further
refines this definition by pointing out that the objectives
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pursued are those developed during the "strategy formulation
process" [Ref. 1 S: p. 3].
Structure is "the design of organization through
which the enterprise is administered" [Ref. 19: p. 5 ]•
Characterized by two components 1| lines of communication
and authority and 2) lines of information and data flow,
several structural types exist including the centralized
functional organization of which NAVDAC is representative.
The position proposed by Chandler is that an organi-
zation's strategic choices will influence its organizational
structure. Fir us with a chosen mission and strategy will
adopt a structure suited to the accomplishment of the stra-
tegy. Since strategy formulation is an on going process,
strategies can change based upon the changing environment
and organizational mission. Likewise the organizational
structure is dynamic, undergoing modification to produce
that structure which reflects the current strategy. As
summarized by Nathanson:
Chandler's general thesis is -hat structure follows
strategy. Changes in a firm's strategy result from an
awareness of the opportunities and needs - created bv
changing copulation", income, and technology - to employ
new ci, at least, a refashioned structure if the
enlarged enterprise is to Dperate efficiently.
[ Ref. 19: p. 6 ]
Chandler delineates four organizational forms each
representative of a different growth strategy. These four
forms are the centralized functional, the decentralized
multifunctional, the holding company, and the matrix form.
[Ref. 19: p. 5] NAVDAC represents the centralized functional
form. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Implementation study
saw their task as taking "a realistic review of the func-
tions to be performed and development of an organizational
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structure (including assignment of responsibilities) to
accomodate those reguiremen ts" [ Ref . 7: p. 23]. The struc-
ture recommended by the Implementation Plan and adopted by
the Navy was a centralized functional command.
Organizational growth can occur through initial
volume expansion, geographic expansion, vertical integration
and product diversification. It is in the period of
geographic expansion that the functional organization arises
offering a solution to "administrative problems of interunit
coordination, specialization, and standardization" [Ref. 19:
p. 13]. These problems were all demonstrated prior to the
formulation of NAVDAC. Control of AD? resources was decen-
tralized therefore increasing the complexity of interunit
coordination. Standardization of systems, particularly
across command lines was ineffective, each command claiming
their unigue mission as justification for specialized
systems.
A major concept is that of the fit between an organ-
ization^ strateay and stricture. Goodness of fit implies a
better utilization of resources. Resources are defined as
those items utilized by the organization in the achievement
of its mission. The effectiveness of an organization, and
ultimately its survival will depend upon its goodness of
fit. The importance of this concept is not nearly so
noticeable during times of economic prosperity. It is
during + iaes of resource scarcity that the organization if
forced into change. "Organizations do not change their
structures until they are provoked by inefficiency to do so"
[Ref. 19: p. 13].
2 - The Functional Organization of_ NAVDAC
NAVDAC offers two major products, 1) DPI management
and 2) Navy wide ADP management. As discussed in Chapter 3,
NAVDAC through default (lack of a Savy-wide ADP strategic
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management plan, and inadeguate support in the policy arena)
adopted a short range strategy, that of lanaging the
NARDAC*s. It is the opinion of the author that the current
organization of NAVDAC reflects this decision.
If as postulated, NAVDAC has concentrated on the DPI
portion of its mission, it would be expected to take on the
characteristics of a singls product firm and hence a greater
degree of centralization would be evidenced than by a multi-
product firm. The greater degree of centralization arises
because the organizational structure will influence the
degree of centralization/ decentralization exhibited. "The
functional organ ization is usually more centralized, and its
departments are specialized and arranged by function"
[Ref. 19: p. 6].
The matrix organization combines characteristics of
both the functional and product oriented organizations.
NA7DAC attempted a product oriented organization by
including both operational and strategic responsibilities
within its departments. This was evidenced by individuals
interviewed who refered to NAVDAC a= a matrix organization.
The technical codes, 30, 40, and 50 oombine the responsibil-
ities for the Navy-wide and DPI programs within their
respective areas (systems software, applications software,
ana DPI operations respectively). The formation of a func-
tional vice a matrix organization resulted because NAVDAC
chose to concentrate upon the DPI portion of its mission.
As noted by the HAC SSI, "It vas estimated that over 80
percent of NAVDACs cede 30, 40, and 50 effort is geared to
coordination and management of the NARDAC's" "Ref. 22: p.
144].
NAVDAC s structure has evolved towards a functional
organization designed around the function of managing data
processing installations. This functional organization
became even more evident after the 1979 reorganization in
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which "six directorates and some special staff office
elements were combined into two directorates, streamlininq
the Command along functional lines" * Ref • 26: p. 10].
C. ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES
The boundary "of a system is a dosed line placed around
certain objects so that there is less intensity of interac-
tion across the line or auong objects outside the line than
among objects within the closed line" "Ref. 18: p. 216].
With regard to the NAVD&C organization the boundary
encompasses NAVDAC and the NARDAC 1 s/NAVDAF' s. External to
the boundary but still pact of the relevant environment are
the users, the CDA's, aid Congress. This section cf the
thesis will focus upon the user is he relates to the
NARDAC's across the boundary. In tiis respect the NARDAC's
become boundary spanning units. lie relationship will be
examined with regard to the "sale" of data processing
services and the implications organizationally of NI?
funding.
As defined above, a boundary includes some form of
interaction across the closed line. An example of an inter-
action may be a transaction or "an economic exchange between
two or mere parties" [Ref. 27: p. 3]. In determining the
placement of an organizational boundary Ouchi and Barney
propose an efficiency approach. "The objective is to define
that boundary which (1) allows parties to an exchange to
obtain sufficient information to jidge the fairness with
which t hev are being dealt in the relationship and (2) to
accomplish this task at minimus cost" "Ref. 27: p. 3].
Since a transaction is an economic exchange, and there-
fore quantifiable to some extent, oost/ber.ef it analysis is
relevant. When the costs of a transaction outweigh the
benefits gained, consideration should be made towards
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relocating the transaction in relation to the boundary.
"Because the criterion if efficiency, we can in each case
determine whether the moving of an organizational boundary
will yield efficiency benefits or not" [Ref. 27: p. 2].
Governing transactions is accomplished differently
internal and external to the boundary. External to the
boundary, competition is recognized and the relevant gover-
nance mechanism is the market. Internally, competition does
not guarantee eguity to both parties therefore the gover-
nance mechanisms rely upon the recognition of some hierarcy.
"The importance of a boindary lies in the difference in
governance mechanisms which it implies. .. The objectives of
an efficient boundary analysis is to discover the division
between internal and external governance mechanisms that
will yield the lowest cost of governance" [Ref- 27: p. 4].
Ouchi and Barney suggest that the proper selection of a
transaction governance meohar.ism may effect the survival of
an organization, particularly when rssources are scarce.
Relating to the discussion presented in the previous
chapter, it should be noted that both domain consensus and
governance mechanisms inflience resources. In an improper
governance mechanism, resources are jsed inefficiently. In
domain donsensus, resources are iot obtained. It is
suggested by the author, that an improper governance
mechanism may influence the achievement of domain concensus.
With reference to NAVD4C and the user, the provision of
data processing service is a transaction that takes place
across a boundary line. The transaction takes 3n character-
istics and is governed by a mechanism dependent upon whether




Transactions or economic exchanges are characterized
by three variables;
• The degree of performance accounting ambiguity,
• The degree of goal congruence between the parties, and
• The frequency of transaction occjrance [Hef. 27: p. 7].
Performance ambiguity stems from two sources, "an
inability to measure the performance of parties in an
exchange and an inability, even if performance can be
measured, to be able to accurately value it in the exchange"
[Ref. 27: p. 7]. High performance ambiguity implies that
competition will not ensure equity between parties and
therefore the need for in internal governance mechanism. A
low degree of performance ambiguity, where it is easy to
value the exchange and measure the performance, can be
accomplished through the market and therefore is external to
the organization.
Goal congruence describes "tne state of a relation-
ship between two or more parties" *Ref. 27: p. 13]. High
goal congruence implies that both parties are engaged in
profit maximizing behavior and therefore governance takes
place in the market. Low goal congruence requires transac-
tions be governed internally in orier to ensure fairness to
ail parties.
The frequency of a transaction's occurrance provides
the means by which a cost/benefit analysis may be accom-
plished. The purpose is to determine whether the cost of
establishing internal governance mecnanisms doesn't outweigh





"Governance mechanisms are the social processes
which serve the function of maintaining the perception of
equity among the participants to a transaction" [Ref. 27: p.
15]- As mentioned previously, governance mechanisms can
exist both internal and external to the organization
dependent upon t be characteristics of a specific transaction
(performance ambiguity, goal congraence, and frequency).
"External modes of governance achieve the perception of
equity through a normative acceptance of competition in open
markets as a legitimate form of social control. Internal
modes of governance achieve this end through the normative
acceptance of a legitimate hierarchy as the substitute for a
competitive market" [Ref. 27: p. 15].
Figure 4. 1 provides a breakdown of the types of
governance mechanisms as they occur internal and external to
the boundary and their basis in pricss, rules, or values.
The internal mechanism can take on three forms, the
quasi-market, the bureaucracy and the clan. A quasi- mar ket.
exists when divisions are treated as profit centers and
internal pricing mechanisms occur.
The bureaucracy and the clan form both rely upon the
legitimate hierarchy, but the clan demonstrates the ability
to accept "short-term inequity with the expectation of
long-run equity" [Ref. 27: p. 2 0]. The bureaucracy with its
reliance upon rules is characteristic "of functionally
organized enterprises" [Ref. 27: p. 18].
"External governance mechanisms can take on three
forms, the market, the bur eaucraticaily assisted market and
the clan assisted market. The latter two are "external forms
of bureaucratic and clan governance" [Ref. 27; p. 22] and
are characterized by rules and values respectively. Within
the external bureaucratic market Legitimate authority is
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Informational Basis of Governance Mechanisms




















Figure 4.1 Governance Hechanisms.
passed to a third party which is recognized by both parties
to the transaction. In the clan assisted market there is "a
common belief that both parties to the exchange will act in
a manner so as net to take advantage of the other" [Ref- 27:
p. 24 ].
The existence of the bureaucratic and clan assisted
markets suggest that a strictly competitive market fails to
provide equity between parties at the lowest possible cost.
Intermediate external governance forms such as clan and
bureaucratically assisted markets arise when simple
market prices fail. The key difference between the two
governance mechanisms lies in the extent to which market
prices are augmented by subtle, imformal relations based
on mutual trust and closeness, on the one hand, and
rules, arbitration, and third oarty authorities on the
other. [Ref. 27: p. 25]
Figure 4.2 maps the governance mechanisms just
discussed to the transaction characteristics of goal congru-
ence and performance accounting ambiguity. Note that when
goal congruence between parties is low and performance






















[Ref. 27: p. 28]
market
| market
Figure 4.2 Transactions versus Governance,
D. NAVDAC AND N IF FUNDING
When the ADP Implementation Study was conducted prior to
the formation of NAVDAC, the philosphy was that NAVDAC would
be initially mission funded with an eventual progression
towards a combination of mission funding and cost
reimbursable funding. "If feasibl planned -hat
users will budget and pay for ADP services and DPIs and
DPPSOs of NAVDAC will be operated as cost centers" [Ref. 7:
p. U8 ]. The rational behind this proposed transition was to
place the responsibility for monitoring ADP costs upon the
user. One of the problems identified by the AD?
Implementation Study had been that "users, in general have
no concept of ADP development and operational costs"
[Ref. 7: v. 2, p. D-25]. 3y ceasing to provide ADP as a
free gocd and by making the user responsible for his cost,
economies were hoped to be realized.
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1- The Model as It Applies to NAVDAC
NAVDAC and the NARDAC'S are currently mission
funded, that is NAVDAC requests for and receives funds from
Congress to maintain its operations. Services are provided
to most customers at no cost (some customers, example being
NARF's, work under a chargeback system where the NARDAC is
reimbursed for costs incurred) . Services are provided in
three general areas;
• ADP appiicat ion system development - includes analysis,
design, programming and documentation of computer appli-
cation programs,
• DPI services - running of applications programs or
provision of computer capacity,
• Technical support services - consultant services.
The problem of unbudgeteS costs is negotiated on a case by
case basis, wi xh the NARDAC absorbing such costs when
possible. [Ref. 28: p. 2]
In terms of the model discussed in the previous
section, mission funding is a transaction governed by
internal mechanisms. Specifically the governance mechanism
is a bureaucracy, where rales prevail. Rules stipulate the
procedures by which NAVDAC obtains its resources (the POM
process) and ty which the customer then reguests ADP
services (NAVDAC INST 5230.1 A). The transaction specific to
a bureaucratic governance mechanism is characterized by a
medium degree of goal congruence and a high degree of
performance accounting ambiguity. It is assuied that both
NARDAC's and the customer are treated equitably.
Recent direction has dictated that NAVDAC will
transfer to NIP funding in the near future. This move was
prompted by a Government Accounting Office (3A0) report
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("Accounting for Automated Data Processing Costs Needs
Improvement", Feb. 7, 1978, B 115369) which noted that
without proper cost accounting procedures, justifiable deci-
sions could not be made regarding system replacement and
that customers were not aware of costs generated by their
proposals.
A transaction accomplished through NIF funding is
governed through an external mechanism, specifically a
bur eaucratically assisted market.. An actual transfer of
funds occurs as in a market environment, but rules exist
goveming the utili2ation by us^rs of non-NAVDAC ADP
sources. This mechanism is characterized by a medium degree
of performance ambiguity and a low degree of goal
congruence.
The move from an internal to external governance
mechanism suggests something about the transaction charac-
teristics of performance ambiguity and goal congruence.
With regard to performance accounting this suggests that the
sale of data processing services is something that can and
is quantifiable and sold on the market.
With regard to goal congruence, the move from
mission funding to NIF finding suggests that it has proved
diffucult to educate the user in ADP costing. The goals of
the NAP.DAC's and the respective users have proved to be
incongruent. NARDAC's exist to support customers with data
processing services. The customer sees ADP as a tool to be
used in the accomplishment of his individual mission. When
this tool is offered free of oharge, there is no incentive
to economize.
The preceeding discussion suggests that mission
funding cf the NARDACs did not present the most efficient
boundary, specifically in terms of zrost. By moving to NIF
funding, thereby externalizing the transaction, efficiency
across the boundary is improved. Additionally by making
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individual user commands rs sponsible for funding ADP, NAVDAC
is removed from the Congressional limelight. This will be
discussed further in the following chapter.
If as has beer, suggested, users in the future
receive permission to contract outside the NARDAC's for ADP
services, the progression towards 2. strictly market gover-
nance mechanism will be complete. It should be noted that
ths concept of competition ias been introduced.
Implications are that the NARDAC's will be required to
market their product at a competitive price if the survival
of the organization is to be assured.
A question for future discussion is whether, by
returning resource control back to the user, we are not
returning to our position of six years ago. By placing
responsibility for ADP costing upon the user, we place upon
him the necessity to develop his own mechanisms for dealing
across the boundary. This implies the creation of units
internal to the user organization specifically designated to
manage ADP. A natural progression appears to be the future
decentralization of ADP billets so that commands have a
qualified individual to assist with !^DP.
E. CONCLUSIONS
During the course of the chapter it has been shown that
the strategy adopted by NA7 DAC is reflected in its organiza-
tional structure. The strategy was necessary to ensure the
initial survival of the organization (domain consensus was
achieved) and the structure exemplifies the strategy. This
goodness of fit is vital for an organization, particularly
during times of resource scarcity. Additionally we have
seen hew transactions, specifically the transfer of data
processing services, caa be moved with relation to the
organizational boundary in order to increase efficiency.
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The question that arises is assuming NAVDAC is not
pursuing its complete mission, should it be reorganized, or
perhaps should the mission be redefined to reflect the
current organization, with the policy function located
higher (at OP-9U2?). With regard to Chandler's thesis has
NAVDAC reached that degree of inefficiency where organiza-
tional change is warranted?
A proposed reorganization is costly in terms of
resources, particularly because of the personal upheaval it
generates. Before embarking upon a reorganization the anti-
cipated costs (particularly with regards to performance)
should be weighed against potential benefits.
To propose a reorganization hers without yet a clearly
defined non-tact ical ADP strategic management plan, would be
tantamount to repeating the errors of six years ago. The
primary obstruction to the development of an &DP strategic
plan appears to be the lack of goal congruence between
NAVDAC and the user. Although it seems that some sugges-
tions might be warranted for future consideration. The idea
presented is based upon the following assumptions:
• A Navy non-tactical &DP strategic management plan is
produced and reflects the need to retain a centralized
ADP command, responsible for the management cf non-
tactical ADP (budget ing, policy, AIS approval,
standardization) .
• Adequate support and guidance is provided to NAVDAC in
the performance of the above mission.
• The NARDACs continue to be a viable concept, or if not
the cost of another alternative (loss of control over
standardization yielding functional duplication)
outweighs the benefits (responsiveness) to be gained.
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• NAVDAC achieves a domain consensus that a allows it to
fully implement its mission.
The idea represents not so much a reorganization, because
the supposition is that NAVDAC has not changed in its
original intent, but a redesign to reflect the functions as
currently defined in the aission statement.
1 . Proposal
NAVDAC currently reflects a functional organization
based upon products, sys-ens software, applications software
and computer center operations.
An alternative approach adopted from Gulab, is based
upon what is accomplished in x.he course of administering
data processing vice what is produced. The accomplishments
include the;
• Operation of data processing installations,
• Provision for the purchase of or design in house of new
products (equipment, and software), and
• Drafting of policy and standards.
The proposal envisions three divisions, the first
division being composed of those functions from the codes
30, 40, 50, and 90 shops involved with NAEDAC management.
Specifically this division would be responsible for the
short range, operational responsibilities of NAVDAC.
The second division would encompass Automated
Information System Design and acquisition. It would be
responsible for the approval, design and development of new
hardware and software systems for jse within the NARDAC's
and Navy wide. 3y combining applications and systems soft-
ware development in one division it is hoped to eliminate
contention problems that have arisen in the past.
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The third division would be responsible for loner
range planning and policy development . Currently these two
functions exist in separata departments, an odd split since
policy is normally viewed as being zleveloped in support of
strategic plans.
The proposal attempts to eliminate the conflict
between long and short range planning by separating these
two responsibilities into separate divisions. It also
attempts to eliminate criticism that NAVDAC spends too much
time on policy development, or NAVDAC spends too much time
on NARDAC management, both of which were heard in the course
of interviewing for this chapter.
The following chapter evaluates the criticism that




V. N&I5AC: IT15 CRITICIZERS
A. INTRODUCTION
Control systems deal with the systematic collection,
analysis and distribution of organizational information in
an attempt to influence human behavior.
Information and control systems typically try to influ-
ence behavior by specifying what kind of bahavicr is
appropriate and by providing soma means of gathering
information about the adequacy of the behavior thai.
takes place. Management uses this information for
several purposes: to coordinate the activities of
different parts of the organization; as a basis for
taking corrective action where problems exist; and to
reward and punish the behavior of members of the
organization. [Ref. 29: p. 5 ]
The examination contained in this chapter will consider
first the general characteristics of control systems, with
particular emphasis upon the completeness and ob jectiveness
of of measurement criteria. Also discussed will be the
tendency of control systems to produce dysfunctional
behavior when evaluation criteria ara limited to a parti-
cular segment of the entira job.
Congressional oversight as an example of control will be
examined, looking at tha nature of the control, and the
desired and achieved results. Ih3 author proposes that
there is a lack cf predefined standards for measurement and
evaluation in the federal government. When standards are
ncn existent, objective criticism is impossible. The posi-
tion held is not that those individuals currently in the
evaluator positions should not be there, but rather that tha
systems used be more clearly defined.
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Finally internal Navy control systems will be discussed
from the position that those measure ment standards that do
exist produce dysfunctional behavior by concentrating on
only a segment of the entire NAVDAC mission.
The importance of control systems is that those who
manage resources must be convinced of an organization's
ability to handle such resources responsibly. "At the inst-
itutional level, organizations subject to norms of
rationality measure their fitness for the future in satis-
ficing terms. Even if an organization is convinced of its
readiness for the future, its measurements must lead others
to the same conclusion" [Ref. 20: p. 88].
B. THE NATURE OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
Control systems are described by looking at the evalua-
tion criteria, feedback (speed, freguency, source) and the
nature of the job being performed.
Control systems measure and when in conjunction with
reward systems, reward individual performance insuring that,
performance is in line with organizational goals. As
pointed out by Lawler and Rhode, motivation to come to work
does not guarantee movxivation to perform effectively.
Table I is a classification of control systems presented
by Lawler and Rhode. The table lists the characteristics of
control systems and the values that they can assume. "The
importance of the different dimensions varies as a function
of which behavioral reaction is being considered and which
group of people is being liscussed" "Ref. 29: p. 45]. That
is to say that the "proper" control system may differ
depending upon the individual. Individual perceptions of
the nature of the control system, such as fairness, also
influence the effectiveness of the system in modifyinq




A Classification of Control Systems
Characteristics of Sensor Measures
A. Complete - Incomplete
B. Objective - Subjective
C. Influen ceable - Honinfluenceable
Nature of Standards
D. Set bv person being measured,
superior, other higher level managers,
staff people or others
E. Very difficult - Very easy
Source of Discrimination
?. Person being measured, superior,
other higher lavel managers, staff
people of others
Pattern of Communication
G . Person being measured, his superior,
his oeers. his subordinates, rop
management, staff oersonnel, or
others
Speed cf Communication
H. Immediate - Delayed by
Frequency of Communication
I. Continuous - Every
Type cf Activity
J. Important - Unimportant
Source of Motivation
K. Extrins ic, intrinsic rewards
[Ref. 29: p. U5 ]
j
when control systems are tied to reward and punishment. The
perception of fairness may be influenced by the objective-
ness of the standards, the ability of -he individual to
correct action, and the frequency of the feedback provided.
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1 • Dysfunction Effacts
Dysfunctional bahavior is that which interferes with
tha achievement of overall organizational goals. The
conflict arises when organizational goals do not coincide
with individual goals and vice versa. An implicit assump-
tion here is that the organization has goals. For future
discussion it will be assumed that the goal of NAVDAC,
although unstated, is batter managemant of non-tactical &DP,
including management of the NARDAC's, system design and
acquisition and policy/standards generation.
Two types of dysfunctional bahavior ara of interest
in the context of this paper. Tha first is bureaucratic
behavior. In rigid buraaucratic behavior an individual
concentrates on performing those actions which are maasured
by a control system. This performance while causing
"employees to behave in ways that look good in terms of -he
control system measures" nay ba "dysfunctional as far as the
generally agreed upon goals of the organization ara
concerned" [Hef. 29: p. 83]. This rasult will be discussed
later in the paper with regard tc the Code 10 actions in
NAVDAC.
The second fori of dysfmet ior.ai behavior of
interest is strategic behavior. In strategic behavior the
individual alters "behaviors for a period of time to make
the control system measuras look accaptable" [ Sef . 29: p.
86]. An example of stratagic behavior would be on a produc-
tion line, where 60* of tha monthly quota is produced during
the final 10 days of the month. Quota is met but in reality
a much higher quota might be justifiad. As with bureauc-
ratic behavior, strategic behavior is dysfunctional only
whan it conflicts with organizational goals.
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2. Causes of Dysfunctional Behavior
Incomplete standards against which people and organ-
izations are measured can cause bureaucratic and strategic
dysfunctional behavior. Although complete standards them-
selves can result in dysfunctional behavior, such as
resistance, "because it often is a threat to individual need
satisfaction" [fief. 29: p. 95]. When an individual finds it
impossible to perform well in all areas of measured perfor-
mance his self esteem is threatened and resistance arises.
The more objective the standards are, the easier it becomes
to identify deficiencies or incompleteness in the control
system. Hence objectivity and completeness work together.
The nature cf the standard influences the type of
behavior produced. Inflexible standards, particularly those
where the individual being measured had no input into the
creation of the standard and views such standards as being
unreasonably difficult, can cause bureaucratic and strategic
behavior. The management by objective program (MBO)
attempted to deal with this problem by including the
employee in the goal setting process.
The choice of the individual doing the evaluating
produces mixed results. when the individual being evaluated
plays a part in the evaluation process, the occurance of
dysfunctional behavior can be decreased. "Having the indi-
vidual act as the discriminator tends to reduce rigid
bureaucratic behavior and resistance" [ Ref . 29: p. 103].
When feedback is negative though the individual may supress
or invalidate evaluations.
The choice of individual to whom information
concerning performance is returned can be a cause of
dysfunctional behavior. "When information goes to someone
(e.g., a superior) who either has or potentially has the
power to give extrensic rewards, rigid bureaucratic
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behavior, strategic behavior, and invalid data are much more
likely to be present" [Ref. 29: p. 103], The concept of
reward systems being tied to control systems is particularly
evident in the discussion of Congressional oversight which
follows. In that situation, where evaluation is conducted
in conjunction with budget hearings, not only rewards, but
the ultimate survival of ttie organization is at stake.
The speed and frequency of feedback can cause
dysfunctional behavior when reward systems are based upon
information received. Although characteristics of feedback
appear to be a secondary cause of dysfunctional behavior.
Lawler and Rhode place more emphasis upon the completeness
and nature of the standard as a primary cause.
The importance of an activity can influence the
object! veness of the standards and hence result in some form
of dysfunctional behavior. "The mors important an organiza-
tion considers an activity the more likely measures of it
are to be distorted" [Ref. 29: p. 108]. Organizationally
important issues, especially when tied to reward systems,
become individually important and hence increases the like-
lihood that dysfunctional behavior will result because of an
individual's desire to look good. This factor is similar to
incomplete measures, because particular activities are
weighted more heavily than others creating an overconcentra-
tion on those items.
The previous discussion is summarized in the Table
II which lists characteristics of control sys'tems that
produce dysfunctional behavior.
C. CONTROL OF NAVDAC
Recently substantial criticism has been directed at
NAVDAC particularly by the House Appropriations Committee
Survey and Investigations staff (HAC SSI). This portion of









Characteristics of Control Systems
1
ALL DYSFUNCTIONAL BUREAUCRATIC STRATEGIC
BEHAVIORS BEHAVIOR BEHAVIOR
Characteristics of Sensor a. incomplete Incomplete
b Subiective Obiecttve Objective
c Uninfluenceable Intluenceable —
Nature of Standard d Set by others Set by others Set by others
without participation
e. Very difficult Very difficult Very difficult
Source of Discrimination f. Superior or
Other
Superior -Other Superior/ Other
Recipients of Communication g Superior or
Other
Superior' Other Superior i Other
Speed of Communication h Fast Fast Fast







The general opinion is that no criteria were ever estab-
lished against which NA7DAC could be measured.
Congressional oversight: is usually sporatic, with little to
no follow up on the organizations plan to rectify noted
deficiencies. The right of oversight is a constitutionally
granted priviledge, but the constructiveness of
Congressional criticism is guestionei.
1 • Problems Noted bv the a AC S&I
Initial reservation was expressed during the HAC
report en Department of Defense (DDD) appropriations for
198 1. At that time it was stared that "the Committee wishes
to express its doubts as to the ability of the Naval Data
Automation Command to do its job of administering the non
tactical ADP program" [Ref. 30: p. 149]. The Survey and




2 • Areas of Critic! si
The HAC S&I returned its report to Congress in May
198 1. The results were outlined in the Report of the House
Committee on Appropriat ions for 1982. The five areas of
concern were:
• ADP is not a major concern of top level Navy management.
• There is a need for better use of the CDAs.
• There is a morale problem in ADPSO.
• NARDAC's have not bean productive in developing stand-
ardized systems.
• There should be contiaied decentralization of the CDAs.
Specifically with regard to concern by top level management
the HAC stated that "ADP is perceived to be unimportant in
the overall scheme of things to nerit the interest and
concern of several CNO staff echelons. As a result there is
no cohesiveness in the management of AD?" [ Ref . 22: p. 141].
The recommended solution proposed by the committee was to
relocate NAVDAC higher in the organizational hierarchy.
The second area of concern involved the lack of
progress exhibited by NAVDAC towards the creation of stand-
ardized systems. Noting that The functional sponsors had
managed to standardize within their specific areas, the
report stated that standardization across command lines had
not been achieved. Progress made towards the development of
some "standard" systems at NARDAC San Diego was discounted.
"It is doubtful that the systems woiid ever be truly imple-
mented Navy-wide because thers is no official at the "top"
who is likely to "champion" the standardization effort
against expected resistance from those outside the NAVDAC
community" [Ref. 22: p. 142-143]. rha recommended solution
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proposed was to effect greater control over the development
of systems.
Comments directed towards ADPSO concerned the seem-
ingly micro-management of the acquisition process, and the
poor lines of co nmunication with NAVDAC. It was felt that
contract administration, which at the time under discussion
consumed 80% of personnel resources, could best be managed
elsewhere. The committse felt that "a more productive
arrangement would be to merge ADPSD with NAVDAC headquarters
Code 10 functions of review and approval of claimant ADPSO
requests" [ Ref . 22: p. 144]. It was also suggested that the
"organization might best be structured on a team basis
whereby each team becomes totally knowledgeable of a major
claiments functions and needs and therefore able to reduce
the time necessary for review and acg uisition" [ Ref . 22: p.
144], It is suggested by the author that formation of teams
around major claimant's functions might increase the lack of
standardization across command lines discussed in the
previous paragraph. The possibility exists of each team
becoming dedicated to the mission needs of a particular
major ciaiment. The suggestion presupposes an open mirded-
ness towards standardization that appears to be lacking at
the major claimant level. Instead organization around
general functional areas (personnel, payroll, inventory)
might alleviate this problem.
Criticism of the MARDAC's fooused upon responsive-
ness to user reguests, and the general overall quality of
service provided. It was felt that the concept of a region-
alized data processing center had been surpassed by
technology. Solutions included the use of NARDAC's for
strictly standard systems or the return of NARDAC resources
to the major user in the area. Prior to NAVDAC's formation,
ADP oriented projects were in direct competition with the
mission essential items of the individual controlling
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commands. Individuals interviewed for this thesis have
suggested that this situation provided commands with a
source of money and billats when higher priorities arose.
To take the latter approach would affectively return the
Navy to the position at which it was six years ago r and the
situation that NAVDAC was designed to correct. As pointed
out in Chapter 4, the decentralization of resource control
would relegate NAVDAC to an OP-91 equivalent, setting the
Navy back 6 years.
The final area addressed by the committee concerned
the future organizational position of the CDA's. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the CDA's wars excluded from NAVDAC
but provision was made for their eventual incorporation at
sometime in the future. The attitude exhibited by the
Committee was that responsiveness was better and overall the
user was better served by retaining control of the CDA's
under the functional sponsors.
3. Comments on Congressional Dvs r sight
The report of the H AC SSI is an example of a control
system tied to a reward system. This section of the chapter
evaluates the system against the characteristics discussed
earlier.
a. Characteristics of the Measure
That a defined evaluation system is lacking
comes as little surprise since NAVDAC itself lacks any such
tool against which to measare its own progress. As pointed
out previously incomplete measures can produce dysfunctional
behavior. The question becomes "What happens when there are
no published measures?"
As pointed cut by Thompson, organizations which
come under criticism point to past accomplishments in crder
to justify their continued existence. "Under norms of
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rationality, organizations facing relatively stable task
environments seek to demonstrate fitness for future action
by demonstrating historical improvement " [Ref. 20: p. 89].
Since no measures exist, who can say that NAVDAC has not
done an acceptable job. In that the term acceptable becomes
subject to individual interpretation. The result becomes,
that evaluator who carries the greatest power determines the
evaluation. Congressional criticise of NAVDAC, although not
tied to a defined control system, carries more weight,
because adverse criticism implies less funding in the
future.
b. Nature of the Standard
Since no previous published standard and mile-
stones exist it becomes impossible to evaluate the standards
as to 'heir rigidness, or ease of accomplishment. It is
suggested though that had NAVDAC and the Navy known the
extent to which the Congressional evaluation would delve, it
would have perceived the standards as being too all encom-
passing to be achieved ii the time period allotted. This
suggestion is based upon the observation that NAVDAC concen-
trated on the NARDAC portion of its mission, while
Congressional criticism was directed at all portions of
NAVDAC's mission.
c. Source of Discrimination
That Congress has the eight and the responsi-
bility tc evaluate NAVDAC is not questioned. When resources
are limited it becomes the duty of the controlling organiza-
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D, INTERNAL EVALUATION OF NAVDAC
Internal to NAVDAC there appears little or no method of
evaluating its performance as an organizational entity, nor
that of the NARDAC* s. Interviews with individuals connected
to NAVDAC reveal that an ^valuation strategy established for
the NARDAC*s has since been abandoned and that the internal
NAVDAC MBO program is given only token attention.
Evaluation of the NA3DAC*3 is conducted on the manage-
ment by exception principle. If users are dissatisfied to
the point that message traffic is geierated, that particular
NARDAC is not doing its job. Likewise if service received
warrants a commendation, a message is sent and the relevant
NARDAC is doing a good job. While a valid management tool,
this practive forces NAVD\C into a reactionary role, and
only augments the planning problem that currently obstructs
NAVDAC.
Above NAVDAC in the organizational hierarchy, evaluation
criteria appear to concentrate on approval of Automated
Information System (AIS) requests. This criteria selects
one division of NAVDAC (oode 10), and conceatrates on a
small portion of the overall NAVDAC mission. From inter-
views this practice results in AI3 plans being approved
without proper documentation. Instead of returning defi-
cient plans to the responsible (initiating) activity,
telephone modifications are made aid page changes to the
relevant documents are submitted. The procedure is viable,
and may provide adequate quality control as long as
personnel in Code 10 are familiar with user activities and
their proposed AIS. Potential for problem exists when
employee turnover creates a loss of continuity and famil-
iarity with user needs. Cost benefit analysis needs to be




NAVDAC appears effirieat because the system acquisition
process is smoother and takes less time. But the question
that must be addressed concerns the user who submitted the
initial request. What motivation does the user have to
submit a complete and accurate request when he knows a patch
job can be done en it?
A particularly interesting observation is that during
interviews conducted, when asked what evaluation criteria
were utilized to evaluate and control NAVDAC 1 s performance,
the most prevelant answer was that no defined criteria
existed, but who else in the Navy hai any either.
E. SUMMARY
As pointed out in the chapter, Congressional criticism
of NAVDAC was based upon no predefined standard but gained
legitimate authority in that Congress controls the
resources. Requests for correction, elicited promises but;
no reevaluation was CDn ducted to ensure compliance.
Referencing the definition of control systems, information
was collected by the HAZ SSI, behavior modification was
desired, but. the amount achieved is subject to question.
Internal to the Navy evaluation concentrates on two
araas, acquisition of ne* systems and NARDA3 management.
Standards in these two areas are undefined. Combined the
two areas encompass only a portion of NAVDACs overall
mission. When NAVDAC attempts to excell in these areas it
exhibits bureaucratic and strategic dysfunctional behavior,
because a vital portion of the mission is overlooked, that
of Navy wide ADP management. The observation that other
commands lack defined evaluation and control systems does




VI. SOHMART MS CONCLUSIONS
A. SOHHARY
Strategic planning is an on going organizational
process, starting initially with the development of an
activity mission and progressing through organizational
goals and objectives, and finally short range operational
plans. The discussion in the preceding chapters has
centered on the question of what happens when the strategic
planning process is not operational. With reference to the
Navy, the lack of a strategic management plan for ADP has
resulted in the development of a centralized ADP command,
designed to correct the oast rather than focusing on the
future. This despite the fact that the Navy already had a
centralized ADP command.
Secondly a discrepancy developed between NAVDAC s
assigned mission and domain. The limited domain insured
organizational survival but prevented NAVDAC from imple-
menting its complete mission. This self imposed limitation
resulted in a functionally oriented organizational structure
designed towards DPI operation.
Finally the lack of a plan has resulted in NAVDAC being
evaluated against non-existent standards, both internal and
external to the Navy. It is therefore impossible to state
objectively that NAVDAC has or has not fulfilled its
expectations.
The Navy is currently in the process of attempting to
formulate a strategic management plan for non tactical ADP.
The current draft plan though exhibits the major problem
that has obstructed such planning to date. There is a lack
of consensus as to the purpose of ADP within the Navy.
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If ADP is only a tool to be used in the performance of a
given mission then it should be decentralized and the
resources returned to the individual commands in order to
make it as responsive as possible. Conversely if ADP is an
end in itself, then all resources should be placed under the
cognizance of a single command.
In reality there appears to be a combination of these
philosophies existent within the Navy and hence the prcbletn
has arisen. The problem relects a short sightedness on the
parr of the user activities. There is an inability or
unwillingness to see further than an individual activities
mission.
B. THE FDTUBE
Questions to be addressed in the future include:
• What are the ramifications of returning resource control
to the user.
• What is standardization, what areas should be standard-
ized, and at what point does standardization become
detrimental.
• Where are we going with \DP in the future. What is
NAVDAC's position in that future.
The National Academy of Science has been tasked with the
responsibility of reviewing the future of nop. tactical ADP
in the Navy and NAVDACs position in that future. It is
feared than unless close attention is paid to the real
requirements that the Navy will once again find itself
implementing technology based upon the dictates of perceived
technological pressures. The letter to the National Academy
of Sciences stated that,
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Over the next decade, we expect Navy Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) support to move from central data
processing complexes zo distributed systems that will
put processing tools directly in the hands of the
manager- [ Eef . 31 ]
The point to be made is that until we identify future
reguirement
s
r goals and objectives, we ought not to be plan-





ADP Automated Data Processing
ADPE Automated Data Processing Equipment
ADPSO Automated Data Processing Support Office
ADS Automated Data System
AIS Automated Information System
ASN (FM) Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management
CASDO Computer Application Systems Development
Offica
CDA Central Design Activity
CENO Central NOMIS Office
CNO Chief :f Naval Operations
DON Department of the Navy
DPI Data Processing Installation
DPPSO Data Processing Support Office
FACSO Facility Systems Office
FMSO Fleet Material Support Offioe
GAO General Accounting Office
MSDO Management Systeus Development Office
NARDAC Navy Regional Data Automation Center














Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Data Automation Command
Navy Regional Data Automation Facility
Naval Facilities System Command
Naval Material Command
Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Supply Systems Command
Navy Industrial Fund
Office of the Secretary of Defense
System Support Center
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